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THE NEW ROLE OF THE COURTS IN
DEVELOPING PUBLIC WELFARE LAW
ST. JOHN BARRETT*
Three years ago it could be said that the federal courts played
virtually no role in shaping the rules which determine whether an
individual is eligible for public assistance under federally financed
programs. The intervening period has seen a dramatic change.
Whereas until January 1967 the federal courts had finally
adjudicated but one action on welfare grants under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the provision most readily invoked for such action,,
the Commerce Clearing House today publishes the Poverty Law
Reporter to inform practicing attorneys of pending litigation and
court decisions in this rapidly developing field.
This article will attempt to examine both the reasons for and the
significance of this burst of welfare litigation activity. Before doing
so, however, it is necessary to outline briefly the statutory structure
of public welfare in the United States and the mechanisms by which
welfare rules were developed before the courts were projected onto
the scene.
THE STATUTORY STRUCTURE
Prior to the enactment of the Social Security Act2 in 1935 the
administration of public assistance to needy persons was a state and
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I. Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 84, 115
(1967).
2. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1394 (1964),
as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969).
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local function. Local welfare officials, often on an essentially ad hoc
basis, dispensed public largess to those who were determined to be
both destitute and deserving, and neither community attitude nor the
law contemplated any recourse for a rejected applicant. The Great
Depression and the resulting enactment of the Social Security Act
marked a change, in some degree, in both attitudes and law. In
denying a means of livelihood to large numbers of persons more
skilled, articulate, and politically aware than the traditional "poor,"
the Depression caused a "democratization of poverty" which
resulted in an increased concern for the objectivity and fairness of
the rules.
Presently, welfare programs in the United States generally fall
into two groups.' The older form of assistance, paid for and
administered by state and local government, is known as "general
assistance." Federal financial support provided under the Social
Security Act has been termed "categorical assistance," the Act
_providing for federal cost sharing in state programs to assist
categories of the needy as defined in the Act: The aged in Title !,"
needy families with children in Title IV, Part A, the blind in Title
X,7 and the permanently and totally disabled in Title XIV. A state
may participate in one or more of these programs, but to do so, it
must submit a plan to the federal agency meeting the requirements
of the federal statute If the state submits a plan meeting all the
statutory requirements and including no provisions expressly
prohibited by the statute, the federal administrator then "shall"
approve the plan. 0
3. Cf. Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 642, 645-
46 (1966).
4. See Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 895-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd sub nom.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 38 U.S.L.W. 4223 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1970).
5. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (1964), as antended, (Supp. IV, 1969).
6. Id. §§ 601-609.
7. Id. §§ 1201-1206.
8. Id. §§ 1351-1355.
9. Some of the m6re significant requirements common to all of these programs are that
the plan be state-wide in operation, that it be administered by a single responsible state agency,
that it provide that all individuals wishing to make application for assistance under the plan
have an opportunity to do so, that such assistance be furnished with reasonable promptness
to all eligible individuals, and that an applicant have an opportunity for a "fair hearing"
before the state agency if his "claim for assistance" under the plan is denied or is not acted
upon with reasonable promptness. E.g.. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a). 1202(a), 1352(a) (Supp. IV,
1969).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 302(b). 602(b), 1202(b). 1352(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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Once a plan is approved, the state is entitled to federal financial
contributions for both assistance'payments and administrative costs.
Considerable latitude is given the state in defining who is "eligible"
for assistance, and the state may restrict eligibility to a class that is
smaller than the broadest group for which federal matching funds
would be available." By the same token the state plan may define
eligibility in terms broader than the federal definition without
voiding the entire plan; the state must merely assume the full cost
of providing assistance to those individuals who fall outside the
federal definition.12
The Act also permits the federal administrator considerable
latitude in deciding whether state plans meet the statutory
requirements. The policies developed in the administrator's passing
upon state plans have been customarily embodied in the Handbook
of Public Assistance Administration.3 Until recently, the Handbook
provisions were not formally promulgated as regulations or
published in the Federal Register, although they were given the effect
of regulations."
Basic eligibility requirements and some of the more basic
procedures are fixed in each state by state law. The various states
have customarily set forth and expanded their "plan" provisions in
a welfare "manual,"'" the state's official rule book for operating the
welfare programs, which also derives its authority from state law.
In many states the application and payment process is actually
administered by city or county officials who use the "manual" as
their guide.
If a state enacts a welfare law, adopts a manual provision, or
implements in practice a standard or procedure which is inconsistent
with the Social Security Act or with the federal Handbook, the
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is
II. See. e.g., Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(I0)(B) (1964), which gives the states
power to determine eligibility for assistance. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH. IDUC. &
WI-L'ARE. HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, pt. IV, § 5500 [hereinafter
cited as HANDBOOK].
12. For a discussion of totally state-funded programs, that is, general assistance, see note
4 supra and accompanying text.
13. HANDBOOK.
14. 45 C.F.R. § 201.3(d) (1969).
15. See. e.g., N.C. BOARD OF PUBLIC WELFARE. NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
MANUAL Of- POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR ADMINISTRATION OF OLD AGE ASSISTANCI-. AID
TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND AID TO-THE PERMANENTLY AND TOTALLY DISABLED (1952).
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empowered to determine, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
that the state is not "in conformity" with federal requirements and
is no longer entitled to receive federal contributions for the particular
welfare program in which the violation occurs. 16 If dissatisfied with
the Secretary's determination, the state may seek judicial review in
the Court of Appeals. 7 The end result of a determination that the
state is out of conformity is the complete termination of federal
funds for the program, or, in the discretion of the Secretary, the
offending portion of the program. Although no lesser remedy is
provided, a recent court decision relating to another federal program
suggests that the United States may have a claim in federal court
for injunctive relief to compel the state to abide by federal
requirements. 8
METHODS OF DEVELOPING THE RULES
It is one thing to understand the formal mechanics of rule
making and legislation. It is something else to understand how rules
are actually shaped and who influences their shaping. As indicated
by the above, there are essentially four levels of legal rules in the
welfare area: The federal statute, the federal policy embodied in the
Handbook, the state statutes, and state policy embodied in the state
welfare plans and manuals. This section will first consider the
development of rules at the grass-roots level-the state welfare
manual-and then work up to the federal statutory level.
State plans and amendments are prepared by state welfare
officials and submifted to federal officials for review and
determination of whether they conform with federal law and policy.
Whatever the pressures acting upon the state welfare officials-and
important among these will be political pressures for reduced
spending-the essential dialogue in arriving at suitable language for
the manual provisions will l6e between a professional welfare worker
at the state level and a professional welfare administrator at the
federal level. If these two officials are satisfied with their mutual
product, the deal is closed.
The process of formulating state legislation differs little from the
processes involved in formulating state welfare manual provisions.
16. See. e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 304 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969).
17. Social Security Act § 1116,42 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. IV, 1969).
18. United States v. Frazer, 297 F. Supp. 319 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
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Except for intermittent concerns about saving tax dollars and
improving the morals- of welfare recipients, a state legislator
ordinarily has little concern with the technicalities of welfare
legislation. It is drafted by the same professionals from the state
department of public welfare who draft the manual provisions, and
it is ordinarily drafted with one principal object in mind-to meet
the federal requirements for federal funding. Thus, to ensure
compliance when state legislation is being considered, just as when
state regulations are being drafted, the federal professionals will be
consulted by the state professionals, and often the language of the
state statute itself will have been suggested, if not drafted, by a
federal official.
Again, at the federal rule-making level, the process remains in
the hands of welfare professionals. Here, however, the concern of
federal administrative officials is turned to members of Congress
who, as influential members of appropriations or other committees,
have become more or less expert in welfare law. Unlike other areas
of national legislation such as public health, where there has
traditionally been an influential and articulate constituency outside
the Government, the dialogue in developing legislation and rules in
the welfare area* has been, until recently, essentially between the
federal and state administrators and members of Congress. And, the
influence of congressional committee members has extended beyond
the formulation of federal administrative rules to encompass the
actual application of such rules in practice. A federal official called
before an appropriations subcommittee having the power of life or
death over much of his program will find it difficult to refuse
commitments on how particular statutory provisions or
administrative rules will be applied. Once such a commitment is
made, there exist few counteracting pressures to deter the federal
welfare official from carrying it out.'9
It is thus hardly surprising that the established modes of
developing welfare rules should have discouraged innovation, free
and open public discussion, and responsiveness to the needs and
feelings of the welfare recipients. However, new factors and
19. This rule-making dialogue between congressional committees, or committee members.
and the federal administrator has often been conducted in executive session of a committee
or by some other means not involving public notice or disclosure. For a consideration of
similar exercises of legislative "supervision" of administrative action, see W. GELLIIORN &
C. BYSE, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 166-95, 181 n.43 (1960).
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conditions have recently altered the rule-making system and have
initiated profound changes in the rules themselves.
New Elenients in the Equation
To a lawyer. the most obvious new element in the development
of welfare "rules" is the role of the courts. In its past two Terms
the Supreme Court has held durational residence requirements in
welfare to be unconstitutional 20 has ruled state "man-in-the-house"
provisions in AFDCO' to be contrary to the Social Security Act; 21
has determined that a welfare recipient need not exhaust his
administrative remedies in order to challenge the validity of welfare
rules in federal court;ss and has affirmed a state's right to recover
past payments of welfare. 4 In the present Term the Court will
determine issues of due process in welfare administrative hearings;2
has set for argument a case concerning the validity of the new HEW
regulation implementing the decision in King v. Smith.' and has
already heard argument on the validity of state-imposed "family
maximums" for benefits under AFDC.-
Yet, the activity of the courts, though important, is only part of
the story. The role of the poor people in enlisting court scrutiny of
the welfare program and the effect of the court decisions in
stimulating action by welfare administrators and Congress
constitute the rest of the story.
20. Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
21. Aid to Families with Dependent Children. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964). as
amended. §§ 601-10 (Supp. IV. 1969).
22. King v. Smith. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). noted in 18 BUFFA.O L. Rtiv. 623 (1969), 18
DEPAUL L. REv. 897 (1969). and52 MARQ. L. REv. 422 (1969).
23. Damico v. California. 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
24. Snell v. Wyman. 393 U.S. 323 (1969). aJ*g men,. 281 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
25. Wheeler v. Montgomery. 296 F: Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 38 U.S.L.W. 4230
(U.S. Mar. 23. 1970); Kelly v. Wyman, affd sub noma. Goldberg v. Kelly, 38 U.S.L.W. 4223
(U.S. Mar. 23. 1970). [Ed. note: see note * following note 104. p. 128 infra.]
26. Lewis v. Stark. Civil No. 50238 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 23. 1968), prob. juris noted sub norn.
Lewis v. Montgomery. 396 U.S. 900 (1969) (No. 560 Misc.; renumbered No. 829. 1969 Term),
hearings scheduled sub noma. Lewis v. Martin, 38 U.S.L.W. 3302 (Fcb.'l,7, 1970) (No. 829).
27. Dandridge v. Williams. 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968), noted in 4 GA. L. REV. 203
(1969). [Ed. note: While this article was at press, the Supreme Court reversed the district
court's decision. 38 U.S.L.W. 4277 (U.S. April 6. 1970).] For a review of similar cases
decided and pending in the lower federal courts, see CCH PovERTY L. REP.
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The Poor and the Courts
The economically underprivileged who recently have asserted
increasing pressure upon the welfare system are drawn largely from
the racial minorities of American society. Experienced by the civil
rights movement of the last decade, they brought to the welfare
battle a d-veloped leadership schooled in both direct action-by way
of protest demonstration and civil disobedience-and court action.
Pressures from these poor have found a ready point of focus in the
courts because legal counsel has been available to initiate litigation.
Although for some years free legal services were available to the
indigent in urban areas to defend against criminal prosecutions and,
in some cases, civil actions, only very recently has counsel been
available to indigents to initiate and sustain lawsuits to determine
and enforce their legal rights. For the past two or three years such
counsel, largely through the arm of neighborhood legal services
supported by the Office of Economic Opportunity, has been
available for this purpose in virtually every metropolitan area. In
addition, the p'ractice of "poor people's law" has attracted some of
the most energetic and able of our recent law school graduates.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the courts might not have
undertaken an affirmative role, even with available counsel to get
welfare issues before them. Indeed, it seems fair to assume that
similar issues brought before the courts 50 years ago would have
received a withering response. Even as recently as 1967, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a suit
instituted by a welfare recipient seeking injunctive relief against
"nighttime visits" by welfare workers, stating that there was no
"right" to welfare and that the court therefore need not and should
not determine the propriety of the complained-of practice.18 In an
earlier era this dichotomy between "right" and "privilege" would
have been sufficient to bar relief to the welfare recipient or applicant
in virtually any court in the country-no matter how available and
able the legal counsel.2 '
By 1967, however, many of the judges-at least those sitting on
the federal courts -had received considerable experience in handling
cases brought against government officials on issues involving the
28. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs. 259 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1966).
29. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
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right of individuals to such public "privileges" as professional
licenses, government employment, and entering into government
contracts. In handling these cases the courts had become somewhat
accustomed to applying rules that arose from cases involving the
direct imposition of government restraints upon the citizen-the free
speech, unlawful police practices, and racial discrimination cases.
Furthermore, because of the considerable volume of cases under the
fourteenth amendment relating to racial discrimination, the courts
were not only well experienced in dealing with official-defendants
reluctant to change methods of administration generally condoned
by the community; the courts also had become accustomed to
enforcing the rights of underprivileged individuals without the aid of
a clear congressional mandate.
The judiciary thus projected into the picture, all elements were
present for a rapid and orderly development of the law. First, four
different sets of rulemakers were now involved-the Congress, the
federal administrators, the state administrators, and the courts. This
permitted a sort of four-sided game of leapfrog. If for any reason
the federal administrators were inhibited in the development of new
rules-perhaps because of the disapproving views of members of an
appropriation committee-the courts could assume the lead in
developing new legal requirements. Once the courts had spoken, the
federal administrators could then respond by framing a rule
embodying the judicially-enunciated principle, perhaps even
embellishing it a bit. State administrators would also find themselves
somewhat freed by the court decisions and the federal rule making
to undertake innovations that otherwise might have been inhibited
by local political pressures. Such state-developed innovations would,
in turn, give federal officials, federal judges, and the Congress a
greater assurance in developing and applying similar rVles
nationally. Development of the law could thus proceed in an ever-
ascending spiral with no single participant in the process having the
capacity to block progressive development.
One element, sometimes present in developing areas of the law
but not present in the welfare area, might have impeded any orderly
development responsive to the poor people's demands. This is the
element of a clearly defined, deeply committed, and influential
opposing interest group. Opposition to a procedural rule in the
administration of the welfare program or to a rule defining eligibility
for assistance is relatively. diffuse: the only person having a strong
[Vol. 1970:1
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and direct interest is the welfare applicant or recipient. A welfare
worker, while he may disagree with a change in the rule, can hardly
feel that it is a bread and butter issue for himself. Art ordinary
citizen not on welfare is affected only to the extent a change in
welfare rules may result in additional spending and increased taxes.
Thus, while disagreement with new welfare rules may be broadly
based and sometimes reinforced by racial or social prejudice, it is
unlikely to be deeply felt or sharply focused. This permits the
rulemakers-legislators, administrators, and courts-to go about
their business fairly undisturbed.
The importance of this absence of a strong and articulate
opposing interest group can best be appreciated by comparing the
development of rules in the welfare area with the development of
rules in a somewhat related area-that of racial discrimination in
federally supported programs as forbidden by Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.30 Much like the welfare situation, essentially all
the elements necessary for a speedy and orderly development and
application of the law to eliminate racial discrimination were
present. The subject of desegregating public schools, however, was a
gut issue for a majority of the citizens in the southern states and
hence for their Congressmen. For this reason, although the same
four types of rulemakers were involved, if one of the actors advanced
even slightly beyond the others he was subjected to very strong
adverse pressure through the Congress, the press, and other avenues
of public and political influence.
The pressures to which the courts were subjected after the
Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education3
are well known. For many years implementation of the decision was
in large measure frustrated on the charge that the courts had
exceeded their authority and were usurping "legislative" functions.
The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 muted many of
these cries, the initiative being given federal administrators to
eliminate discrimination in educational programs receiving federal
financial assistance. However, when the Commissioner of Education
issued his implementing "guidelines" 3 he soon found himself, along
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1964).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally J. PELTASON. FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 1-29
(1961).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
33. 45 C.F.R. § 180 (1969).
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with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, summoned
before congressional committees to explain why they were going
beyond court decisions and congressional mandates.3 4 The
administrators, no less than the courts, were subject to vituperation
and pressures which impeded the orderly development and
enforcement of the law 5
In the welfare area the courts not only are relatively free from
adverse pressures in developing a rule of law; they have an unusually
wide assortment of tools with which to accomplish it. The fact that
there are four rulemakers-congressional, federal administrative,
state administrative, and court-means not only that there will be
interaction among the four, but also that the courts in deciding
cases can do so on constitutional, federal statutory, federal
regulatory, state statutory, or state regulatory grounds. Obviously,
this makes for a great de'al of flexibility. A federal court, while
issuing a stern warning about a constitutional problem, can at the
same time avoid deciding the constitutional issue and construe the
Social Security Act in such a way as to reach a result which general
principles of equity seem to require. Or the court may give broad
effect to a federal regulation and thereby invalidate a conflicting
state statute or administrative practice. And, as the role of the courts
has increased, initiative in the rule-making process has shifted from
the welfare administrators and the legislators to the welfare
recipients-the plaintiffs in the lawsuits. The administrator is no
longer left to decide just when and how he will meet a particular
issue. Rather, he will be forced to meet the difficult problems at the
time, and more or less on the terms, that the plaintiffs choose.
With this general discussion of the elements of the process as
background, an examination of two concrete examples should prove
helpful. The first example involves the development of the rule Ihat
a welfare recipient given notice of termination of his assistance is
34. See Hearings on Proposed Cutoff of Welfare Funds to the State of Alabama Before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1967) (testimony of Hon. John W.
Gardner, Secretary, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare); Hearings on Guidelines for
School Desegregation Before the Special Subcomm. on Civil Rights of the House Comnh on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 23, pt. I, at 4 (1966) (testimony of Hon. Harold
Howe, 11, U.S. Comm'r of Education); Hearings on H.R. 826. Policies and Guidelines for
School Desegregation Before the House Comm. on Rules, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1966)
(testimony of Hon. Harold Howe, II, U.S. Comm'r of Education).
35. See Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System. 54 CALIF. L. REV. 326
(1966); 67 COLUM. L. REV.,supra note 1.
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entitled to continued payments pending a decision after "fair
hearing" on the question of his eligibility. The second example
involves the development of the substantive rule that a state may not
deny a family assistance under AFDC on the grounds that a man
not the father of the children is in the home as a "substitute father."
Termination of Assistance Pending Hearing. The Social Security
Act requires that each state plan provide an applicant an
opportunity for "fair hearing" before the state agency if his "claim
for assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with
reasonable promptness. ' 3 6 The federal Handbook applies this
hearing requirement not only to the rejection of applications, or
delay in acting upon them, but also to the "suspension or
discontinuance of assistance in whole or in part. ' 37 Although the
statute does not state whether the hearing should be held before or
after the adverse action by the agency, the Handbook indicates that
the hearing is to be after the suspension or discontinuance of
assistance; and, until recently, none of the states administering
federal welfare programs provided a "fair hearing" prior to
termination of assistance3 s Despite the obvious hardship that such
a rule can visit upon a welfare recipient whose benefits are wrongly
terminated, the rule was not seriously challenged or reconsidered
until early 196731
In June 1967, an action was filed in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Mississippi by a Mr. Williams
and his wife to compel state and local welfare officials to restore the
husband to the welfare rolls under the program for the permanently
and totally disabled.40 Mr. Williams was a 30-year old Negro living
in Leflore County, Mississippi, whose formal education ended after
the fifth grade in a rural Mississippi school. He had worked only at
36. See. e.g., Social Security Act § 2(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(4) (1964).
37. HANDBOOK, Pt. IV, § 6300(c)(1) (1968).
38. See Note, The Constitutional Minimum for the Termination of Welfare Benefits: The
Need for and Requirements of a Prior Hearing, 68 MICH. L. REV. 112, 113 & n.5 (1969).
39. Comment, Withdrawal of Public Welfare: The Right to a Prior Hearing, 76 YALE L.J.
1234 (1967). The author urged that the requirements of due process precluded termination of
benefits to a welfare recipient without affording him an opportunity for prior hearing, arguing
that the principle applied by the courts in licensing and regulatory cases-that an
administrative action based on a factual determination shall not be effective until a hearing is
afforded-should apply with equal or even greater force to a welfare recipient whose very
livelihood is threatened by administrative action terminating his benefits. Id.
40. Williams v. Gandy, Civil No. GC-6728 (N.D. Miss., filed June 9, 1967), noted in 10
WELFARE L. BULL. 7 (Oct. 1967).
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unskilled manual labor. In 1965, while working in a cotton mill at
Greenwood, Mississippi, he suffered an accident resulting in the loss
of his right hand. Thereafter, he applied for and received aid to the
permanently and totally disabled, and his wife and nine children
applied for and received aid for families with dependent children. In
early 1966 Mr. Williams was further diagnosed as having sickle cell
anemia, pulmonary tuberculosis, and chorelithiasis and was advised
by his doctor that he could not return to any work. In November
of 1966, Mr. Williams obtained a prosthesis for his right arm
consisting of a double-prong hook. He alleged in his complaint that
with the prosthesis he could grasp certain small objects but was
unable to lift heavy objects. Be that as it may, a report came to the
county welfare officials that he had been seen at his home splitting
kindling with a hatchet.
In April 1967, Mr. Williams was told by his social worker that
he was "not disabled enough" for aid and that the grant for his
children would probably also be discontinued in another year. About
two weeks later he received a notice in the mail from the welfare
department stating that his case was being closed. The sole
information in the notice regarding the reason for this action read:
"[o]ur reasons for coming to this decision are as follows: The
medical information shows you are not disabled enough to meet our
rules for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled."'"
After getting help from a Mississippi-based attorney who had
been working on civil rights matters in.the state, Mr. Williams filed
a request for a hearing. He also requested and was allowed to
examine the "hearing file" created by the welfare officials for use
in his future administrative hearing. The only information in the file
regarding the reasons for terminating his assistance was the
statement that "the impairment [of plaintiff] is not total as defined
in agency policy."4
Not having received any response to his request for a hearing,
Mr. Williams filed the lawsuit two months after his assistance had
been terminated. He alleged, among other things, that the
termination of his assistance without prior hearing denied him due
process of law. He requested the convening of a three-judge court
and moved for an order temporarily restraining the suspension of his
benefits pending a hearing.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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The filing of this lawsuit produced fast results. The defendants,
rather than going to trial, agreed to restore Mr. Williams's aid
payments. They further agreed to continue welfare payments,
pending fair hearing, to all recipients that the state had determined
to have lost their eligibility because no longer disabled. This
commitment was formalized in an amendment to the Mississippi
welfare manual in May 1968, continuing assistance in all
terminations pending fair hearing.43
Mississippi's response to the Williams suit put it far ahead of
any other state and, indeed, ahead of federal policy, in continuing
assistance pending hearing. But the obvious question for the
Mississippi state administrators was: Would the federal government
provide matching funds for the assistance payments made pending
the administrative hearings? The provision of the federal Handbook
previously had not allowed such matching.
On July 11, 1967, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare sponsored a meeting on fair hearings in public assistance,
attended by federal, state, and local welfare officials and
representatives of civil rights and welfare rights groups. At the
meeting, one of the points most strongly urged upon the federal
officials was the need for continuance of financial assistance pending
the fair hearing decision. A month later the Department issued a
summary of the meeting which, in commenting on this particular
point, stated that under existing policy for federal matching a local
agency was required to terminate assistance within 30 days after a
local welfare agency had decided, before a hearing, that a recipient
had become ineligible. Six days later, however, Under Secretary
Wilbur Cohen was to announce at a meeting of welfare officials his
"Eight Points,"4 including the point that federal matching would
be available for states if they continued assistance pending a hearing
decision. This new rule was incorporated in the Handbook the
following February 5
On this issue, at least, the welfare rights victory in Mississippi
had been complete. Nationally, however, the victory was only
partial. While Mississippi had changed its policies to provide
43. 3 Miss. DEP'TOF PUB. WELFARE, MANUAL § F, at 6100-03 (1968).
44. The "Eight Points" of Mr. Cohen consisted of a statement of newly adopted welfare
polices, then unpublished, which were circulated to state and local welfare officials attending
the meeting. Copies are on file with HEW as an unpublished document.
45. HANDBOOK, pt. IV. § 6500(b) (Feb. 2. 1968).
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continued welfare payments pending decision of an administrative
appeal, the federal agency had determined only that it would
"match" such payments, not require that states make them. Because
of Mississippi's change in policy the court never decided the
constitutional issue in the Williams case. Before the end of the year,
however, the same issue was raised in Wheeler v. Montgomery,6 a
suit filed by welfare recipients in a federal court in San Francisco.
While the Wheeler case was pending, California undertook to
change its fair hearing procedures to provide more adequate notice
to recipients whose aid was about to be terminated, full information
to them regarding the evidence on which termination was predicated,
and an informal conference with the recipient at which he would be
given a full explanation and an opportunity to counter with
information or argument on his own behalf. The new procedures
provided for termination after the conference but prior to the full
"fair hearing" that was required by the statute 7 This new proposal
to continue welfare payments until after the informal conference
gave California an interest similar to that which Mississippi had in
being assured that federal matching would be available for such
payments. The California officials accordingly urged the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to issue a Handbook
amendment as soon as possible that would permit nationally the
kind of matching that had been agreed to with Mississippi. As
already noted, such an amendment to the Handbook was made on
February 8, 1968. This settled the issue of "matching." The issue
of "conformity," that is, whether the federal rule would require that
each plan provide for assistance pending decision on fair hearing,
remained unsettled.
Before the Wheeler case came to trial before the three-judge
district court in San Francisco, the plaintiff, Mae Wheeler, had been
restored to old-age assistance, and the California State Department
of Welfare, having been assured that federal matching funds would
be available, had adopted the new procedures calling for an informal
conference before termination. Although the court retained
jurisdiction of the case as a class action, it decided on the merits that
46. 296 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 38 U.S.L.W. 4230 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1970).
47. CAL. STATE DEP'T OF SOCIAL WELFARE. PUBLIC SERVICES MANUAL, Reg. 44-325.434
(April 1, 1968).
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the new California procedures met the requirements of due process
and dismissed the complaint0 8
About the time that the three-judge court was dismissing the San
Francisco suit, the construction of Resurrection City and the Poor
People's March in Washington, D.C. were getting into high gear. On
April 30, 1968, Reverend Abernathy served his first set of demands
on the federal government departments, including a demand that the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare adopt a policy
requiring that aid payments be continued until fair hearing appeals
were decided. 9 In responding to this demand a month later,
Secretary Cohen said only that "as of July 1, 1968 we will require
that any agency may not reduce or discontinue a payment without
first notifying the recipient in advance and giving him time to
question the facts or the contemplated action and discuss them."0
This was essentially the California rule.
In a second set of demands on behalf of the Poor People's
campaign, Reverend Abernathy repeated that HEW "should act
now . . . to make full assistance payments during appeals from
decisions to reduce or terminate payments."51 In responding this
time, Secretary Cohen finally committed the Department to "require
the States to continue assistance to families where discontinuance or
reduction of assistance is being appealed, with appropriate
safeguards to assure proper and efficient administration of the
provision.""2
While HEW was in the process of meeting the poor's demands
on this point, yet another lawsuit raising the issue was filed in a
federal court. In Kelly v. Wyman, a number of plaintiffs in New
York City sued to enjoin enforcement of the New York rules which
required termination of welfare benefits immediately upon a
determination of ineligibility, in both the federally-funded
categorical assistance programs and the state supported general
48. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 296 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 38 U.S.L.W. 4230
(U.S. Mar. 23, 1970).
49. Unpublished document on file with HEW.
50. Letter from Secretary Cohen to Reverend Ralph Abernathy, May 25, 1968, on file with
HEW.
51. Statement of Reverend Ralph D. Abernathy on Goals of Poor People's Campaign,
Press Release by Reverend Abernathy (June ii, 1968), on file with HEW.
52. Letter from Secretary Cohen to Reverend Ralph Abernathy, June 18, 1968, on file with
HEW.
53. 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 38 U.S.L.W.
4223 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1970).
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assistance program. At the time the complaints were filed the New
York rules required no prior notice of suspension of payments and
no hearing prior to such action. With respect to the general
assistance program, a rule had been adopted only two weeks before
the action was filed requiring that a hearing be afforded after
termination of benefits.54
While the Kelly case was pending before the district court in New
York, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was
developing and considering a new regulation which would require the
continuation of payments pending a fair hearing decision on
termination or reduction of assistance in all cases in which the issue
turned on a disputed fact or the applicability of an eligibility ru'le
to a particular recipient. On October 30, 1968, the Administrator of
the Social and Rehabilitation Service proposed such a rule to
Secretary Cohen, who approved it on November 26, 1968 5"-the
same date on which the federal court in New York rendered its
decision in Kelly that due process required,.prior to termination, an
opportunity to be confronted with the evidence upon which
termination was based, an opportunity to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, and the right to present evidence and argument
on one's own behalf." In publicly announcing the new regulation,
which, in some respects, cut more broadly than the decision in Kelly
would have required, the Department emphasized that "[t]his policy
is in line with a decision handed down this week, as a matter of
constitutional requirement, by a three-judge federal district court in
New York." 5
The new rule, scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 1970, has
evoked considerable opposition from state administrators, and its
final form will be determined largely by the manner in which the
courts resolve some of the basic statutory and constitutional issues
in the pending cases.58
54. 18 N.Y. CODES. RuLe. & REGULATIONS 84.2.23 (1968). It is perhaps revealing of the
general attitude toward ,welfare recipients and of the relative lack of development or the law
in this area that as late as 1968 the state of New York had no hearing provision whatever in
its general aid program.
55. 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969).
56. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly,
38 U.S.L.W. 4223 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1970).
57. HEW Press Release (Nov. 29, 1968).
58. It is interesting to note that although some of these issues-including what constitutes
an adequate hearing and whether state-funded legal counsel must be provided-are currently
under review by the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts are continuing to grant relief in
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"Man-in-the-House." There is a long tradition in the
administration of public welfare of devoting available resources to
those of the needy who are "worthy." With respect to needy
children, this question of worthiness has taken the form of aiding
those in a suitable home environment. Thus, 50 years ago aid to
children would ordinarily go to the children of a widow of good
repute. Children of a woman divorced, and certainly of a woman
unmarried, could expect little help from a public welfare agency5
Although the withholding of welfare to children because of an
unsuitable home of course did nothing to improve the environment,
the moral judgment of the community was expressed by refusing tax
monies to support them. Unfortunately, this left in need those who
were perhaps in greatest need and had its most severe impact on
members of racial minority groups.
Perhaps the strongest community, and hence public welfare,
disapproval was visited upon mothers of children born out of
wedlock who lived with a man other than the children's father. The
welfare rules excluding such mothers and children from public aid
have variously been denominated as "man-in-the-house,"
"substitute father," "unfit home," and "man-assuming-role-of-
spouse" rules. 0 While all of these rules had a common element
relating to the sexual misconduct of the mother, varying emphasis
was placed on the character of the home bnvironment, the presence
of an adult male as a source of income, and the immorality of the
mother as reasons for denying aid.
When the Social Security Act was enacted in 1935 it was quite
clear from the debates and committee reports that Congress intended
the states to have considerable latitude in fixing eligibility
requirements for public welfare and did not intend to preclude the
states from looking to the "moral character" of the applicants t
The statute itself, however, was silent on this point.
cases similar to Wheeler and Kelly without awaiting the Supreme Court's decision. See, e.g.,
Machado v. Hackney, 299 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. Tex., 1969); Caldwell v. Laupheimer, Civil No.
69-397 (E.D. Pa., Nov. 3, 1969); Sims v. Juras, Civil No. 69-238 (D. Ore., Aug. 21, 1969);
Thomas v. Graham, Civil No. 69-141 (D. Ariz., July i1, 1969); Robertson v. Born, Civil No.
51364 (N.D. Cal., June 12, 1969); Miller v. Zoeller, Civil No. 69-C-2 (W.D. Wis., Jan. 20,
1969).
59. See generally W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 3-19 (1965).
60. See O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54
CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966).
61. H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., ist Sess 18, 24 (1935); S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 29, 36 (1935).
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In the early years of administering the Act the federal agency
encouraged the states to consider the fitness of the home in
determining eligibility for aid to dependent children. In time,
however, the posture of the federal agency became ambivalent, with
some members of the agency urging that it was inconsistent to deny
aid to a child because the home in which he was living was "unfit"
while doing nothing to improve the home or remove the child from
it. That the children should not be punished for the sins of their
mothers was suggested with increasing frequency."2 Finally, in 1945,
the federal agency issued a letter to all state agencies stating:
the "suitable home" provision ...may be in part an expression of the
community's concern for the protection of the welfare of children in that
sector of the population in which families suffer more than average hazards.
This provision, if it is used as an eligiblity requirement, will not, however,
protect children. It simply precludes them from receiving aid to dependent
children. To expect that such an eligibility requirement will protect children
indicates a confusion between what public assistance can do to help parents
protect their children and what action can be taken by agencies that have the
authority to protect children from their parents, including even the removal
of the child from his home.3
This letter, however, was purely precatory, and most states with
suitable home policies continued to enforce them.
The failure of the federal agency to take any affirmative action
despite its officially expressed views continued until 1960. In that
year the legislature of Louisiana passed a law under which the fact
of an illegitimate birth created the presumption that the mother's
home was "unsuitable" for any of her children." Within a few
months Louisiana eliminated over 23,000 children from its welfare
rolls, 95 percent of whom were Negro. 5
The plight of the Louisiana children and the focus of national
publicity compelled the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare to cite Louisiana for a hearing to determine whether its new
practices were "in conformity" with'the federal law. After a hearing
the Commissioner of Social Security reluctantly concluded that
there was nothing in the federal law which prevented Louisiana from
imposing this eligibility requirement. The next day, and just three
62. See generally W. BELL. supra note 59, at 20-56.
63. Id. at 150.
64. Act No. 251 § 1, 1 La. Acts 1960 at 527, as amended, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46:233.D(IO) (Supp. 1969).
65. W. BELL. supra note 59. at 137-51.
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days before he was to leave office with the outgoing administration,
Secretary Arthur S. Flemming announced that he was adopting a
new policy to become effective on July 1, 1961, outlawing all
'6suitable home" requirements.66 Although Congress itself probably
never could have been induced to enact this "Flemming Rule," it
quickly accorded it a backhanded endorsement by prohibiting the
Secretary from withholding funds from any state for violation of the
rule before the state had an opportunity to make any necessary
amendments to its own statutes in order to comply.6
Still, Mr. Flemming's midnight coup left many questions
unresolved. For example, even though a state might be inhibited
from ruling children ineligible because their homes were
"unsuitable," might the state still exclude children if their mother
were cohabiting with a man who could be considered a "substitute
parent" for the child? After all, the eligibility of most children for
aid depended upon the "absence" of the father from the home; if
the mother had a de facto'husband, did not her children necessarily
have a de facto father?
The Department took no clear position on the "substitute
father" issue except insofar as such position might be implied from
its continued acceptance of state plans which included "substitute
parent" provisions."6 This was an issue, however, that was bound to
come to a head. Unlike procedural issues relating to fair hearing,
questions of illegitimacy, men living with welfare families while
refusing to assume parental responsibilities, and the dramatic
increase in the AFDC rolls, possessed considerable sex appeal for the
public and for substantial numbers of Congressmen. The issue could
not and did not lie unresolved for long.
In the summer of 1962, a subcommittee of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, chaired by Senator Byrd of West
Virginia, in considering-the fiscal 1963 appropriations for the
District of Columbia, undertook to investigate the administration of
public welfare in the District. The efforts of District officials to
eliminate from the welfare rolls families with which a man other
than the spouse or the father was living figured prominently in the
hearing. The Deputy Commissioner of the Social Security
66. State Letter No. 452, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administration.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Jan. 17, 1961).
67. Social Security Act § 404(b), 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1964).
68. See generally W. BELL, supra note 59, at 148.
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Administration was called before the committee and asked to
explain the Flemming Rule and the application of federal policies to
the practices being pursued by the District's welfare administrators.
In testifying, Mr. Meyers, the Deputy Commissioner, drew a
distinction between a state rule disqualifying a child because some
man other than his father has informally assumed the role of parent,
and a state law requiring, contrary to the Flemming Rule, that the
home be "suitable" or that the mother's conduct be proper. Pressed
by Senator Byrd, Mr. Meyers testified:
Senator Byrd.
Well, after your having heard the explanations of today concerning the
meaning of the rule as it has been applied in the District of Columbia, you
have not found, on the basis of these explanations, any instances in which the
District has violated the Federal statute. Is that correct?
Mr. Meyers.
Let's put it this way. The man-in-the-home policy, as particularly just
explained by Mr. Brewer, although not one that the Federal Government
necessarily espouses or recommends, is one which is-
Senator Byrd.
Nor-let me say on the part of the Congress-necessarily condemns.
Mr. Meyers.
Well, that is right. Some of those cases we would pay for, if the District
wanted to go ahead and pay them. But it certainly is not required. And to
adopt a policy, as stated that way, would be perfectly consistent with Federal
requirements. And if in application the criteria used in determining whether
or not there actually was this parent substitute relationship, where adequate,
then again there could be no question under the Federal requirements.
Senator Byrd.
Very good.
This colloquy fixed the policy of the Department: a "suitable home"
rule would be regarded as inconsistent with federal requirements,
while a "substitute parent" rule would be permissible.
In 1964, Alabama submitted to the Department some new state
plan material under AFDC, including a "substitute father"
provision. 0 The Alabama rule, however, provided that a child would
be considered as having a substitute father if "he lives in the home
with the child's . . . mother for the purpose of cohabitation," or if
"he visits frequently for the purpose of cohabiting with the ...
mother," or if "he does not frequent the home but cohabits with the
69. Hearings on H.R. 12276 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2240 (1962).
70..See generally King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 313-16 (1968).
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child's natural or adoptive mother elsewhere."'7 Despite Alabama's
denomination of this 'as a "substitute father" rule, the last of the
three described situations could hardly be considered as having any
bearing on parental relationship, and the first two looked only to
"cohabitation." Accordingly, the federal agency declined to approve
the plan material. Nevertheless, the state operated under the plan
and HEW took no steps to institute a conformity hearing. The
situation between HEW, the states, and the Congress remained in
equilibrium until 1967.
In October of 1966, Mrs. Sylvester Smith, who lived with her
four children in Dallas County, Alabama, was removed from the
AFDC welfare rolls bcause Dallas County welfare officials had
determined that a Mr. Williams, who was not the father of any of
Mrs. Smith's children, regularly came to her home on weekends and
had sexual relations with her. Except for these weekend visits, Mr.
Williams lived with and supported a wife and nine children of his
own. He contributed nothing and was able to contribute nothing to
the support of the Smith children. Mrs. Smith filed suit in federal
court against the Dallas County welfare officials, attacking the
validity of Alabama's "substitute father" rule. Counsel for Mrs.
Smith urged, and the district court held, that Alabama's denial of
aid to children whose mothers engaged in extramarital sexual
relations, while affording aid to other children, was a denial of equal
protection of the laws. 2 The state appealed.
The case was pending before the Supreme Court at the time of
the Poor People's March on Washington. The initial demands of the
Poor People, to which reference has been made, called upon the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to "eliminate the
infamous 'man-in-the-house' rule now-without waiting for a court
decision. A petition for this action was submitted to the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare more than two years ago. It has
never been acted on."7 3 Secretary Cohen responded: "We do not
favor or support State 'man-in-the-house' rules. We urge the States
to repeal these requirements. We expect the Supreme Court of the
United States to rule on this matter shortly and will take action in
light of the Court decision."'
71. ALABAMA MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, Pt. I, ch. II, § V[.
72. Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967). affd, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
73. Unpublished document on file with H EW.
74. Letter rrom Secretary Cohen to Reverend Ralph Abernathy, June 14. 1968. on file with
HEW.
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On June 17, 1968, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
King v. Smith.75 Although the case had been decided below and
argued before the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds, the
Court avoided a constitutionally-based decision and voided the
Alabama rule on federal statutory grounds-an approach which
could hardly have been anticipated by one familiar with the structure
and history of the Social Security Act. The Court held, in effect,
that if a state chooses to provide AFDC assistance for needy children
because they have been deprived of parental support by the absence
of a "parent," it must provide such assistance for all such children,
and that the state in determining whether a child has an absent
"parent" is bound by the federal definition of the word. Before this
decision it had been assumed by federal administrators that the state
could, by adopting a more restrictive definition of "absent parent"
under its own law, limit the size and cost of its program without
forfeiting federal assistance.
The day after the Supreme Court's decision, Secretary Cohen
issued a further response to the Poor People, stating:
In accordance with the Supreme Court ruling on Monday, the inclusion in
the family, or the presence in the home, of a "substitute parent" or "man-
in-the-house" will not be an acceptable basis for a State for finding children
ineligible for AFDC. We are issuing to the States appropriate regulations to
carry out the Supreme Court decision.l
For present purposes it is probably as well to end the story there.
Suffice it to say that the Secretary did issue new regulations to
implement the Supreme Court decision; the regulations sought to
anticipate certain further questions not expressly dealt with by the
Supreme Court; the State of California challenged the regulations as
going beyond the federal statute and the Supreme Court decision,
and the challenge was victorious in a three-judge federal district
courtV8 The matter is now pending before the Supreme Court7
75. 392 U.S. 309 (1968), noted in 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 623 (1969), 18 DEPAUL L. REv.
897 (1969) and 52 MARQ. L. REv. 422 (1969).
76. Letter from Secretary Cohen to Reverend Ralph Abernathy, June 18, 1968, on file with
HEW.
77. 45 C.F.R. 203.1 (1968).
78. Lewis v. Stark, Civil No. 50238 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 23, 1968), prob. juris. noted sub nor.
Lewis v. Montgomery, 396 U.S. 900 (1969) (No. 560 Misc.; renumbered No. 829, 1969 Term),
hearings scheduledsub non. Lewis v. Martin, 38 U.S.L.W. 3302 (Feb. 17, 1970) (No. 829).
79. Id. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
We have discussed what is essentially a federal legislative
process-the development of rules, both substantive and pr6cedural,
for the administration of welfare. Yet the Congress has played a
passive role. Its influence has been essentially negative, inhibiting
federal administrators from making changes contrary to the
traditional mode of welfare administration.
It is the participation of the courts that has brought the rule-
making process to life. As in other areas of national need in which
the legislative process has become paralyzed-such as legislative
reapportionment, civil rights and procedural protection for criminal
defendants-participation by the courts has been necessary to break
the impasse and permit the other institutions of government to
respond. Thus, we have another example of apparent reversal in the
intended roles of our governmental institutions. Instead of the
legislative and executive branches providing the initiative for the
creative development of new rules, with the courts imposing a
restraining hand when necessary, it has been the courts that have
supplied the initiative and, in some measure, the creativity.
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